of environmental regulation, as well as about the environmental problems that regulation will confront. We can be a bit more confident with respect to the former.
The Future of Environmental Regulation
While environmental regulatory systems will no doubt be buffeted by many fads and fancies over the next 50 years, at least three enduring changes are beginning to take shape. First, and of greatest interest to economists, incentivebased approaches to environmental protection will grow more and more prominent. Here I refer principally to Pigouvian taxes on externalities, the use of marketable permits (or related quantity instruments) to limit pollution, and the use of deposit-refund systems-all in lieu of (or occasionally to complement) more prescriptive, often uniform technology-based standards.
This change is farthest along in the United States, in part because we have always relied to a greater extent than most other countries on markets. Today in the United States, we have taxes on emissions of ozonedepleting chlorofluorocarbons, marketable permits sharply limiting emissions of sulfur dioxide from coal-fired powerplants, and municipalities levying waste disposal charges on households based on the number or weight of garbage bags set out at curbside (Stavins, forthcoming) .
Moreover, such incentive-based systems are likely to be the future of environmental policy everywhere. No discussion of international policy regarding global climate change and what to do about emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases is complete without a lively argument about whether this policy ought to be pursued via carbon taxes or through a system of marketable permits.1 Not a single serious proposal to control greenhouse gases has been advanced in international forums that is predicated principally on governments specifying "approved" production technologies or mandating the characteristics of consumer durable goods or other products. This is a remarkable change. It is now more than 30 years since Allen Kneese and his colleagues at Resources for the Future, as well as a number of universitybased researchers, began making the case for incentive-based approaches to environmental protection. "A license to pollute," huffed legislators and their staffs at the time-virtually all of whom were trained in law but few of whom had been exposed to the case for market approaches to environmental protection, as most law students are today. It would be an exaggeration to report the death of the command-and-control era. Indeed, in both Europe and the United States there is still opposition to more flexible policy instruments. Nevertheless, incentive-based approaches to environmental regulation have gained a toehold they are unlikely to yield, and will become increasingly common in the years ahead.
A second trend in environmental regulation that can only be expected to accelerate relates to requirements on firms to report publicly their emissions to air, water
See Kopp et al. (1999) and land. The first major program along these lines was contained in the 1986 amendments to the Superfund law in the United States and established the Toxics Release Inventory. Under this program, an everexpanding list of industries must report to the Environmental Protection Agency their annual emissions of a comparably expanding group of substances. These reports are made public by the EPA, although many firms beat the EPA to the punch and announce their emissions themselves. Information provision requirements are beginning to be written into other federal statutes and also state and local environmental laws, and are also being used in developing countries where regulatory authorities are weak or nonexistent.
The reason for this proliferation is simple: experience has shown that when firms are required to make public their emissions, they feel pressure to reduce them, even when the levels of emissions are perfectly legal. The Environmental Defense Fund, arguably the most influential environmental advocacy group in the United States, has gone one step further. It takes the emissions information that firms report, couples it with Census data and makes it possible, via the Internet at (http://www.scorecard.org), for each citizen to see how much of each pollutant is discharged in each neighborhood, and also to send an e-mail to plant managers registering concern about these emissions. The spread of electronic communication makes it all but inevitable that governments will require more and more public disclosure about firms' environmental performance (including the amount of fines they may pay for accidents or non-compliance), their occupational safety and health record, and perhaps other dimensions of their operations. So long as citizens are able to make sense of this information, programs like this are not only democratic but also efficiency-enhancing.
A third major trend in environmental regulation will be a partial loss of authority by federal governments-in the United States and elsewhere. Some of this authority will be granted to increasingly sophisticated and restive lower levels of government. At the same time, other powers will gravitate upward to international organizations. There are several reasons for this apparent paradox. The United States and other western democracies presently take almost all of their environmental regulatory actions at the national level. This makes sense for virtually all air and water pollution problems, because of the likelihood of externalities flowing across boundaries of subnational levels of government if regulation were handled there; in other words, national regulation prevents one jurisdiction from exporting its pollution problems to others.
But there is no obvious reason why states in the United States should not have the authority to regulate the stringency of regulations for solid waste landfills, for instance, or possibly even for setting standards for drinking water contaminants, since in these cases no obvious interstate externality is associated with one state's choosing a weaker standard than that of its neighbor.* Even under the current, largely national system in the United States, important environmental regulatory responsibilities are delegated to the states. For instance, even where the federal government sets uniform national air or water quality standards, the states are given the responsibility to monitor compliance with the standards; the states also issue most operating permits and bring the majority of enforcement actions. Given the growing budgets and sophistication of state (and in some cases even regional or local) environmental authorities, as well as the growing mistrust of the federal government, the future will probably bring a devolution of even more authority from the federal government to regional, state or even local governments.
This possibility is only reinforced by the fact that many of the (increasingly minor) pollution problems that remain in the United States are best handled at the sub-federal level. These include air pollution associated not so much with large factories or other stationary sources as with the effects of the decisions of small businesses and individual motorists. Not all states are clamoring for these added regulatory responsibilities, it should be added. Some governors would prefer to be told what to do by the federal EPA rather than be forced to face difficult tradeoffs between environmental quality and convenience or economic growth. But if the effects are principally local, that is exactly where the buck ought to stop.
Even as a number of environmental issues are debated at the state and local level, public awareness is rising that certain environmental problems like climate change, stratospheric ozone depletion, the overexploitation of fish stocks and the loss of biodiversity due to habitat disruption require coordinated international action if they are to be addressed successfully. Moreover, international trade negotiations can be expected to revolve increasingly around environmental issues, as occurred in the North American Free Trade Agreement. Pressures will increase for harmonization of regulatory regimes, especially those of the western industrial democracies.
Very difficult issues will remain, however. Developing countries generally will-and should-resist adopting the same standards that prevail in the developed countries. For environmental problems that are more or less confined within one nation's borders, it makes sense to allow each country to tailor its regulations to local economic circumstances and tastes. As countries' per capita incomes increase, so too will their demand for environmental quality.
Among the wealthier countries, we can expect to see bitter disputes over environmental issues. This will be because of genuine differences in tradeoffs between economic growth and individual freedoms on the one hand, and environmental protection on the other, and also because environmental protection can easily verge into environmental protectionism. For instance, European cattle growers have successfully protected themselves against beef imported from the United States by arguing that it contains hormones that, while lawful in the United States, pose health risks that Europeans are unwilling to bear. Similar cases will occur with increasing frequency as businesses under the threat of foreign competition, including some in the United States, seek protection under the guise of environmental concerns.
The Environment of the Future
It is virtually inconceivable that ambient environmental conditions in the United States, as well as in most other western democracies, will not continue to improve in the decades to come. The past record has been most pronounced in the United States with respect to air quality, which is significantly better in virtually every U.S. city along almost every dimension (U.S. EPA, 1999) . Water quality has also improved substantially in most places, and both solid and hazardous wastes are being handled and disposed of with much greater care than in the past.3 Generally speaking, the experience of the OECD countries mirrors that of the United States.
This favorable environmental experience in developed economies represents a triumph of technology-some required by regulation, some the result of market forces. In effect, the ratio of pollution per unit of GDP has fallen fast enough in the developed world to offset the increase in both GDP per capita as well as the growing number of "capitas" themselves. This trend will continue in the wealthier countries, for several reasons.
First, there is little doubt that as incomes increase, people will demand an increasingly cleaner environment. Second, natural gas is now the fuel of choice for virtually all new electricity generation capacity in many places, and over the next 50 years or so natural gas will gradually replace coal for much of the baseload generation that coal now provides. Since coal accounts for more than half of all electricity generated in the United States, this shift will have positive effects on ambient air quality, and will reduce emissions of carbon dioxide, as well. Nuclear power is quite attractive on the grounds of reducing air pollution, as well, though it faces technological problems of its o~m regarding the disposal of radioactive wastes, as well as political opposition.
Finally, it appears that new cars, trucks and buses-which become less and less polluting with each passing year-will in the not-too-distant future be powered not by internal combustion engines at all but rather by fuel cells that extract hydrogen, initially from gasoline or methanol and eventually from even cleaner sources. Since these "mobile sources," as motor vehicles are called, are increasingly the major contributors to the urban air pollution problems that remain, this change bodes well for the future.
Environmental prospects are less bright in the developing world.4 First, most of the three billion or so new inhabitants of the earth during the next 50 years will be born and live in the developing world. (In fact, in Japan and parts of western Europe, populations will fall unless the decline in fertility rates is reversed, or unless immigration increases considerably.) Second, inhabitants of the developing world will continue to migrate to already very crowded mega-cities. They will want cars and electricity. It is hard to see how China, India and other rapidly growing countries will meet their needs for electrification without making use of their vast coal reserves, although local air pollution problems have become so serious in China that coal use there has dropped in the last two years. While these developing countries, too, will one day see cars powered by fuel cells, it seems more likely in the next few decades that they will rely on old, gasoline-powered internal combustion vehicles. Absent major policy initiatives, this spells trouble for air quality in developed countries. The press of more and more people into cities will also overwhelm water supply and sewage treatment systems-where such systems exist.
These ingredients may appear a recipe for environmental catastrophe, but there is reason to believe that even these serious problems will be overcome. After all, it was only 30 years ago in the United States that the Cuyahoga River spontaneously combusted and that air pollution occasionally got so bad that motorists were forced to turn their headlights on during the day to see and be seen. The rise in living standards in the United States increased the demand for environmental quality to the point that people preferred to take additional increments in the quality of life in the form of a better environment, rather than a fatter paycheck. Evidence on what has come to be known as the "environmental Kuznets curve" suggests that this pattern also holds true in developing countries; that is, environmental quality may deteriorate during a period in which developing countries begin to industrialize, but at some point this deterioration is stopped and reversed as incomes rise (Grossman and Krueger, 1991) . The principal environmental challenge for the developed world today is to help the developing countries increase their standards of living in ways that help them skirt, to as great an extent as possible, the pollution-intensive period through which the developed countries passed.
Perhaps the greatest immediate concerns involve the threat of environmental damage that may be essentially irreversible. Degradation of air or water quality can eventually be reversed. However, we cannot resuscitate a species once driven to extinction or regrow (in any meaningful time scale) a redwood or other old growth forest lost to logging or urban growth. While the forested areas of the United States and a number of other western democracies are greater than they were a century ago, forests are being lost at a rapid clip in many developing countries. This need not be the case. As Waggoner, Ausubel and Wernick (1996) have argued, if agricultural productivity could be lifted up around the world to the average level of today's U.S. corn grower, even a world inhabited by ten billion people would need only half as much acreage in agricultural production. This would greatly reduce pressure to convert forested areas to subsistence agriculture. Similarly, recent increases in forest productivity could make it possible to meet the needs for wood of even a much more populous world while increasing, not decreasing forested acreage (Sedjo, 1999) . These improvements will not happen by themselves, however. The developed world could play a key role in the next 50 years by helping the developing world take advantage of these more productive agricultural and treegrowing technologies, though attitudes in the United States, at least, toward foreign assistance do not suggest that such help will soon be forthcoming.
After faulting others for underestimating the importance of climate change, it would be foolish to make the same mistake here. Indeed, it is likely to be the paramount environmental issue of the next half-century. This is not because it cries out for immediate and strong actions. In fact, the many uncertainties about causes and effects, coupled with the significant time lag involved in attempting to slow the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, point to the desirability of a more gradual approach than that agreed to in Kyoto. It would be prudent for the United States to begin now the task of reducing the rate of growth of its emissions of carbon dioxide, ideally through gradually increasing taxes on the carbon content of fossil fuels (or marketable emission limits), coupled with offsetting reductions in taxes on labor and/or capital. Ultimately, of course, China, India and other rapidly developing countries must also act to slow their emissions growth. But it would be both futile and unfair to ask them to begin doing so until the United States and other western industrial democracies have shown the way.
Other New Technologies
Will the new technologies of the 21st century-information and communications technologies, as well as other technological and biomedical innovations-make it possible to sidestep these environmental problems? After all, genetically modified organisms will make it possible to increase agricultural and forest productivity, although cultural objections may limit the extent to which their potential is realized. Still other such organisms will facilitate the cleanup of soil and groundwater contamination. An economy increasingly based on services and information seems like it should be a cleaner economy than one focused on heavy manufacturing.
On the other side, however, not all technological advances will necessarily be environmentally friendly. As we learn much, much more about the genetic causes of death and disease, it would be surprising if lifespans did not continue to increase. This will mean that more goods and services will be consumed. Even though the Internet may change how businesses and individuals communicate with one another, we'll all still need stuff. This stuff may be delivered to us as a follow-up to electronic commerce-but we'll probably make another trip, or do something else that consumes resources, using the time that was saved in shopping. In fact, if electronic commerce makes it easier to do our jobs from remote locations, it may well promote "sprawl"-another bete noir of environmentalist^.^ To be sure, the technological wonders of today and others as yet unimagined will no doubt change to some extent what we eat (and how it is grown), how long we live, and what we do with our spare time. But heretical as it may sound, these changes will probably fall short of transforming life in 2050 in a way that would make it unrecognizable to people today. For example, life 50 years ago was in many respects not at all unlike life today. Our fathers (and a few mothers) drove to work, See Cohen (1999) for an interesting discussion of electronic commerce and the Internet.
generally by themselves, as most of us do today; in fact, many more of them used public transportation than today. They worked in offices, factories, stores, or on farms that-while much more labor-and pollution-intensive than today-aren't all that different from those of today. They ate and recreated in ways that had less variety and choice, but aren't fundamentally different than how we eat and recreate today. The best guess we can make about the world of 2050 is that although we would be amazed by many of its elements, we will recognize the underlying patterns easily enough.
Thus, people will still use energy, particularly for electricity generation and personal transport. In the developing countries, the demands for economic growth will lead to sharply rising demands for energy, to stresses on water resources, and to pressures for clearing land, which will create tensions with environmental objectives. The face of environmental problems will alter over time, but the fundamental nature of those problems, as well as the policies we use to address them, will look vei-y much the same as they do today. 
